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Abstract
This paper presents a model of the complete microcredit financing chain investor → MIV →
MFI → micro-borrower, in which social-minded MIVs provide funds only to those MFIs which
do not exploit their bargaining power towards micro-borrowers. The MFIs with the highest
bargaining power do not use MIV capital, since eschewing their market power is most costly for
them. Consistent with this prediction of the theoretical model, we find empirically that the net
interest margin, as a measure of MFI market power, negatively affects the likelihood of using
MIV finance. This lends support to the view that social criteria play an effective role in MIVs’
investment policies, thereby also impacting MFIs’ lending behavior.
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1 Introduction
Microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) have become an increasingly important source of funds
for (a subset of) microfinance institutions (MFIs). By now, more than one-hundred MIVs with
assets under management of more than $8 billion are active (MicroRate, 2013, 4). In the early
stages of its development, the MIV sector was perceived as predominantly return-oriented, rather
than socially motivated, and, therefore, as a threat to the double bottom line approach pursued
by many MFIs (although considerable heterogeneity with regard to MIVs’ social orientation was
acknowledged; see, e.g., Goodman, 2006, 17). However, by now, almost all active MIVs endorse
the Smart Campaign Client Protection Principles. Several MIVs have integrated measures of social
performance into their investment appraisal techniques (De Corte, 2012, 3; MicroRate, 2013, 11).
According to De Corte et al. (2012, 3–4), “[T]he ‘double bottom line debate’ that has been so strong
for MFIs is now being passed to the MIV industry, resulting into much more attention devoted to
how MIVs make sure that their investments are ‘socially responsible’”.
This paper investigates the role of MIV refinancing of MFIs both theoretically and empirically. We
set up a model in which MFIs have bargaining power in the market for microcredit. There is an
MIV that is socially motivated, in that it provides finance only to those MFIs which do not exploit
their market power towards micro-borrowers. The larger MFI market power, the more costly it is
not to use it. So the model predicts that those MFIs with the highest market power do not use MIV
capital. We interpret eschewing market power as a proxy for other types of social lending behavior
not contained in the model, which also benefit borrowers at the cost of lower profitability, such as
increasing outreach beyond the profit maximizing level or targeting the poorest loan applicants.
Consistent with the theoretical model, we find empirically that the net interest margin, as a measure
of MFI market power, negatively affects the likelihood of using MIV finance. This is hard to reconcile
with the traditional view that MIVs focus on relatively large, mature MFIs with an emphasis on
financial as opposed to social returns. So we interpret our finding as valid evidence that social
criteria play an effective role in MIVs’ investment policies, which in turn affect MFIs’ lending
behavior in the market for microcredit. To paraphrase De Corte et al. (2012), the double bottom
line debate has already arrived and is operative in the MIV industry.
The paper contributes to the theoretical microfinance literature by setting up a model of the com-
plete financing chain investor → MIV → MFI → micro-borrower. Payments enforced with the
use of non-pecuniary penalties by MFIs in informal credit markets are converted into enforceable
financial claims by an MIV, which acts as a delegated monitor for its investors. The MFI-borrower
relationship is modeled as in Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2013) (henceforth: “RS”; see also Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m,
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2004). We employ the version of their model with public repayment meetings despite individual
liability and with mutual insurance via imperfect side contracting (RS, Subsection 3.3). So our
model contributes to recent attempts to rationalize the maintained use of group lending schemes
even when joint liability is abolished (as, e.g., by Grameen II; see also Gine´ and Karlan, 2014). As
whether ot not MFIs make use of MIV capital is determined by their market power, our model
relates to the heterogeneous set of theory papers which study the impact of competition in mi-
crofinance markets. The classic paper in this area is Hoff and Stiglitz (1997), which shows that
with endogenous entry and scale economies an increase in subsidized loans may reduce the size
of MFIs, raise the interest rate, and decrease the volume of microlending. Two important recent
contributions are Dam and Chowdhury (2014) and De Quidt et al. (2013). Dam and Chowdhury
(2014) analyze the effect of competition on repayment in a setup where credit agents may collude
with borrowers against their MFI. De Quidt et al. (2013) show how a monopolistic MFI can raise
its profit at the borrowers’ expense by exploiting their social capital using joint liability loans.
Empirical studies of refinancing MFIs usually do not focus on MIVs in particular but on interna-
tional suppliers of capital in general. Our paper contributes to this empirical literature by focusing
on MIVs as suppliers of capital to MFIs. Given that MIVs have a more clearly defined mission than
funds for which microcredit is but one alternative investment class, this approach is potentially
fruitful in studying the impact of creditors’ goals on MFI investment policies. Another contribution
is our focus on market power, measured by the net interest margin, as a potential determinant
of refinancing via MIVs. Mersland et al. (2011) investigate the impact of international subsidized
and commercial debt on the social and financial performance of 379 rated MFIs. As measures of
social performance they employ the average outstanding loan balance, a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the MFI particularly targets female borrowers, and a categorical variable showing the
MFI’s preference for urban, rural, or mixed areas. The proxies for financial performance comprise
the return on assets, operational self-sufficiency, and financial self-sufficiency. As for social perfor-
mance, the results indicate a positive relationship between international subsidized debt and a focus
on female borrowers.Furthermore, they identify a positive impact of international subsidized and
commercial debt on rural areas. The findings show no significant relationship regarding the mea-
sures for financial performance. Mersland and Urgeghe (2013) analyze MFIs’ access to international
debt using pooled probit regressions. Besides a general investigation of the determinants of access
to international debt, they put special emphasis on commercial vs. subsidized debt. In particular,
their findings reveal a positive impact of the return on assets on the access to commercial debt and
a negative impact of the portfolio at risk (30 days) and of a dummy indicating whether the MFI
targets women. These results indicate that sources of commercial debt appreciate good financial
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figures and do not value social performance. In contrast, a women dummy has a positive influence
on the access to international subsidized debt.
The paper is organized as follows. The model with perfect competition is presented and analyzed
in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 introduces MFI market power. The empirical analysis is in Section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
To set the stage for the theoretical analysis of the relation between market power and MIV re-
financing, we start with a baseline perfect competition model of the microcredit financing chain
investor → MIV → MFI → micro-borrower. There are several microcredit markets with MFIs mak-
ing group loans with public repayment. The MFIs active in these markets borrow from an MIV,
which acts as a delegated monitor for investors.
Projects
There is a continuum of length one of microfinance markets, with a continuum of length l (> 0) of
micro-borrowers in each market. Each micro-borrower is endowed with one indivisible investment
project, which transforms one unit of input into h (> 0) units of output if the project succeeds.
The success probability in each market is determined by a market-specific shock: in a proportion
q (0 < q < 1) of the markets (“good markets”), the success probability is p (where 0 < p < 1); in
the other 1− q (“bad”) markets, the probability is zero. Conditional on the local shock, returns are
independent. So the probability that two borrowers in a good market both fail is (1− p)2. There is
one MFI per market, which is specialized in making micro-loans in this market and not in others.
The MFI makes individual liability loans of size unity to the micro-borrowers before it becomes
known whether the market is good or bad. Whether they are active in a good market or in a bad
market is contractible between MFI and borrower. The presence of the market-wide shocks implies
that the MFIs’ loan portfolios are risky, so that refinancing the loans is a non-trivial contracting
problem. Apart from these shocks, the microcredit markets are as in RS (Subsection 3.3).
MFIs
The contract entails either private or public repayment. This formalizes the idea that the formation
of groups in microfinance programs and group meetings may serve a useful purpose, even though
there is no joint liability, by giving borrowers the opportunity to mutually insure themselves via
informal side contracts. Given individual liability, a loan with private repayment is a standard
loan. In the case of public repayment, pairs of borrowers who receive a loan form groups. They tell
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the MFI whether they can individually repay their loan or not simultaneously and in public. We
focus on the case of imperfect side contracting. That is, peers can side-contract to help each other
repay in case one borrower says she can repay and the other one says she cannot. Given public
repayment, payoffs can be made contingent on the repayment decisions, both in the loan contracts
offered by the MFI and in the side contracts. The outcome of investment projects, by contrast, is
not contractible either in the loan contracts or in the side contracts.
As in Diamond (1984), the MFI has to use non-pecuniary penalties in order to enforce repayment.
In addition, there is a pecuniary transaction cost per loan needed to process payments in good
markets. Since borrowers in bad markets are unable to repay, the transaction cost does not apply
to loans made in markets which turn out to be bad. For simplicity, both the size of the penalty C
(> 0) and the transaction cost t (≥ 0) are exogenous and independent of whether they apply to a
loan with private or with public repayment.1
The fact that each local market is subject to a market-wide shock means that, even though the
MFIs are well diversified within their local market, their loan portfolios are risky: by the law of
large numbers, a proportion p of the projects succeed in a good market; but with probability q the
market turns out abd and all projects fail. In the baseline model, we assume that MFIs have no
market power and no equity. So they offer the contract that maximizes borrower expected utility
subject to the constraint that they break even. Section 4 introduces MFI market power to the
model.
MIVs
In order to investigate the determinants of MFI access to MIV capital, we assume that MFIs get
loanable funds from an MIV. The relationship between the MIV and the MFIs is characterized by
a costly state verification problem as in Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986): in order
to verify ex post whether an MFI is active in a good market or a bad market, the MIV has to
pay a monitoring cost γ (> 0). Since the MFIs’ loan portfolios are risky, incentive compatibility
requires that the MIV makes use of the monitoring technology if an MFI declares default. We focus
on deterministic monitoring and assume that the MIV has the opportunity to commit ex ante to
use the monitoring technology in case of default. Given that the MFIs have no equity, the MIV’s
expected return is the difference between the expected return on the funds it lends to the MFIs
and the expected state verification cost per MFI.
The MIVs get their money from investors, whose supply of funds is perfectly elastic at the rate
of return ρ (≥ 0). Since the MIV refinances MFIs in all the local markets, due to the law of large
1The model yields qualitatively identical results for any non-negative private versus public transaction cost differ-
ential and similar results with transaction costs for all loans.
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numbers, the return on its loan portfolio is safe. So the contract between the MIV and the investors
stipulates a fixed return ρ.
To avoid case distinctions, let
h > 2Δ, (1)
where
Δ ≡ 1
p(2− p)
[
1 + ρ+ (1−q)γl
q
+ t
]
. (2)
It will turn out that Δ is the equilibrium contractual public repayment on an MFI loan, so that
(1) ensures that the payoff on successful projects exceeds the contractual repayment on two MFI
loans and mutual insurance in borrower groups via side contracting is feasible.
3 Equilibrium
The model is solved backwards, starting with the MFI-borrower contracting problem. We first
consider public repayment and private repayment separately. We then turn to the MIV–MFI rela-
tionship and compare the two repayment modes.
Public repayment
Since we abstract from MFI market power for now, the MFIs offer optimal contracts to the micro-
borrowers subject to their zero profit constraint. Since borrowers in bad markets are unable to
repay and whether a market is good or bad is contractible, it is optimal not to impose a penalty
on borrowers in bad markets. Let 1 + r∗ denote the contractual repayment for each borrower in a
good market. Since borrowers in bad markets cannot repay, in order to break even, a contract must
induce successful borrowers in good markets to repay. We assume that if both group members decide
to repay, then each repays 1+ r∗, while repayment is 2(1+ r∗) if the peer does not repay. Since the
peer’s project is also successful with probability p, a borrower’s conditionally expected repayment
in a good market is p(1 + r∗) + (1− p)2(1 + r∗). The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint
(ICC) requires that the expected penalty (1− p)C is no less than this expected repayment, i.e.,
(1− p)C ≥ p(1 + r∗) + (1− p)2(1 + r∗). (3)
Her participation constraint (PC) is that the expected payoff in a good market is non-negative:
p2 [h− (1 + r∗)] + p(1− p) [h− 2(1 + r∗)] ≥ (1− p)2C. (4)
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Due to the law of large numbers, the proportion of successful borrowers is equal to p in each good
market. So the MFIs’ repayment conditional on being located in a good market
1 + ρ∗ = p(2− p)(1 + r∗) (5)
is safe.
As noted by RS, it does not make a difference whether the public repayment loan involves joint
liability, as borrowers agree to insure themselves anyway. This equivalence would break down in a
setup which takes care of the social tensions caused by joint liability.
Private repayment
With private repayment, the borrower’s ICC requires that the penalty induces her to repay when
her project succeeds:
C ≥ 1 + r∗. (6)
Her PC is
p [h− (1 + r∗)] ≥ (1− p)C. (7)
The MFIs’ safe repayment in a good market is
1 + ρ∗ = p(1 + r∗). (8)
Refinancing microfinance
Next, consider the MIV-MFI contracting problem. The contract specifies a repayment, 1 + rˆ say,
per dollar lent. If the MFI lends in what turns out to be a bad market, it goes bankrupt. Given
zero liquidation value and zero equity, the MIV cannot extract a positive payment from a bankrupt
MFI. Incentive compatibility requires monitoring when the MFI does not repay 1 + rˆ. So the MIV
receives a repayment 1 + rˆ per dollar lent in good markets and pays γ/l per dollar lent in bad
markets. Since the MIV diversifies across local markets, the average repayment per loan net of the
monitoring cost
1 + ρˆ = q(1 + rˆ)− (1− q)γ
l
(9)
is safe due to the law of large numbers.
The MIV acts as a delegated monitor (cf. Williamson, 1986). As it generates a certain cash flow,
intermediation is costless (cf. Williamson, 1986, 169). The MIV borrows from the investors at
interest ρ and repays with certainty.
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Zero profit for the MFIs and the MIV implies
1 + rˆ + t = 1 + ρ∗ (10)
and 1 + ρ = 1 + ρˆ, respectively. Together with (9), it follows that
1 + ρ∗ =
1 + ρ+ (1−q)γl
q
+ t. (11)
That is, the expected revenue of an MFI in a good market (the left-hand side of (11)) equals the
expected total cost per loan in a good market, i.e., the sum of interest, state verification, and
transaction costs (the right-hand side of (11)).
Choice of contract
For public repayment, (5) and (11) together with the definition of Δ in (2) yield 1 + r∗ = Δ.
Condition (1) implies that a successful borrower in a good market is in fact able to repay two loans.
Substituting for 1 + r∗ into the ICC (3) and the PC (4) yields
h
Δ
≥ 2− p+ (1− p)
2
p
C
Δ
≥ 2− p
p
. (12)
For private repayment, from (2), (8), and (11), the interest rate is 1+ r∗ = (2− p)Δ. Condition (1)
implies ability to repay. The ICC (6) and the PC (7) become
h
Δ
≥ 2− p+ 1− p
p
C
Δ
≥ 2− p
p
. (13)
Borrowers get higher expected utility from a contract with public repayment than from a private
repayment loan. This is because the non-pecuniary penalty C inflicted on unsuccessful borrowers
in good markets is the only deadweight loss in the contracting problem, and the probability of
exerting the penalty is lower with public repayment (viz., (1 − p)2) than with private repayment
(viz., 1− p).2 However, the ICC is weaker with private than with public repayment (see the second
inequalities in (12) and (13)), as a lower penalty is sufficient to enforce the repayment of a single
loan, as compared to two loans. So we have:
Proposition 1: Let (1) hold. If (12) holds, then the equilibrium contract entails public repayment.
If (13) holds and (12) does not, then the equilibrium contract entails private repayment. If neither
(12) nor (13) is valid, a solution to the contracting problem does not exist.
2As shown by RS, the deadweight losses are identical if the magnitudes of the penalties under public and private
repayment can be chosen freely.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium repayment type
The determination of the equilibrium repayment type is illustrated in Figure 1. The upward-sloping
lines PCpub and PCpriv depict the (C/Δ, h/Δ)-combinations such that the PCs for public and
private repayment (the first inequalities in (12) and (13)), respectively, hold with equality. The
vertical lines ICCpub and ICCpriv represent the C/Δ-values such that the ICCs for public and
private repayment (the second inequalities in (12) and (13)), respectively, hold with equality. For
points in the cone formed by PCpub and ICCpub the equilibrium repayment type is public. For
those points in the lightly shaded area (between PCpriv and ICCpriv but not in the darkly shaded
cone), MFIs make loans with private repayment. For all other (C/Δ, h/Δ)-combinations, lending
is not feasible.
A decrease in any cost parameter, i.e., ρ, γ, or t, reduces Δ (see (2)). This increases the likelihood
that a solution to the contracting problem exists:
Proposition 2: Let (1) hold. Then, if the contracting problem has a solution for Δ = Δˆ, (all other
model parameters equal) it also has a solution for Δ < Δˆ.
Proof: Suppose (1) and (12) hold for Δ = Δˆ. Then, evidently, (1) and the second inequality in (12)
also hold for Δ < Δˆ. Validity of the first inequality in (12) implies that the derivative of the term
on the left-hand side of that inequality with respect to 1/Δ is larger than the derivative of the
right-hand side. So if the inequality holds for Δ = Δˆ, then it also holds for Δ < Δˆ. An analogous
argument applies when (1) and (13) hold for Δ = Δˆ. (In this case, the lending type switches to
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public repayment if the new value of Δ is such that the second inequality in (12) holds.) ||
Graphically, C, h, and Δ determine a point in Figure 1. A decrease in Δ, holding everything else
equal, corresponds to a rightward movement on the ray from the origin through that point. The
assertion of the proposition follows from the observation that the ray does not leave the area in
which a solution to the contracting problem exists. MFIs switch from private to public repayment
if the decrease in Δ is sufficiently pronounced such that C/Δ grows larger than (2− p)/(1− p).
The upshot of the perfectly competitive version of the theoretical model is that MFIs can refinance
their risky loan portfolio by borrowing from an MIV that has to meet certain return expectations
if the interest, agency, and transaction costs are sufficiently low. While the focus of the empirical
analysis in Section 5 is on the relation between MFIs’ access to MIV capital and their market
power, we will include cost variables in the regressions in order to check whether they have the
predicted signs.
4 Market power
This section introduces market power to the model of Section 2 and attributes a social mission to
the MIVs. In addition to choosing public versus private repayment, MFIs have to decide whether
to exploit their market power or not. The MIV is social-minded in that it provides capital only to
those MFIs which opt not to exert market power. Since the opportunity cost of MIV capital thus
rises with the degree of market power, the most profitable MFIs choose not to use MIV capital at
equilibrium.
Model
MFIs now have bargaining power in the determination of the terms of loans to micro-borrowers
(details are specified below). They have a positive amount of equity, which is less than l, however.
So they are unable to make loans to all potential borrowers in their local market without leveraging
their equity. MIV capital is the only source of external finance. The MIV is not purely interested
in financial returns but also concerned with the way MFIs act in their local market. In particular,
we assume that the MIV provides finance only to MFIs that do not exploit their bargaining power.
MFIs thus face the choice between two business models, commercial or social. A commercial MFI
exploits its bargaining power in the market for microcredit, but cannot leverage its equity by
borrowing from the social-minded MIV. A social MFI, by contrast, borrows l from an MIV and
makes loans to all borrowers in its market, at terms which maximize borrower expected utility
subject its zero profit constraint. Its behavior in its local microcredit market is exactly as described
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in Section 3. The expected profit on its loan portfolio is zero. If a social MFI is unable to break
even at the contractual repayment Δ, then it remains inactive in the microfinance market.3 Both
a social and an inactive MFI can invest their equity in the financial market, thereby generating
final wealth 1 + ρ per unit of equity invested.4 This is the per loan opportunity cost of choosing
the commercial business model.
If an MFI has opted for the commercial business model, the terms of loans to the micro-borrowers
are subsequently determined by Nash bargaining. The MFI’s equity is sunk then. This is a crucial
assumption. If the equity were not sunk and the MFI could still invest financially, then its dis-
agreement payoff would be 1 + ρ, and it would necessarily get a payoff in excess of 1 + ρ in the
bargaining process. Irrespective of how low its bargaining power is, it would always opt for the
commercial business model. So some sort of sunk cost is required in our model in order to have a
genuine choice between social and commercial lending. To keep the model as simple as possible, we
do not introduce a new cost category to the model of Section 2 (e.g., costs of training staff), but
assume that the commercial MFI’s equity is sunk.5
Let u, π, and β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) denote the borrowers’ expected utility, the MFI’s expected repayment
per loan, and the MFI’s bargaining power, respectively. The special cases β = 0 and β = 1 refer
to a competitive and a monopolistic MFI, respectively. Since borrowers have no outside option
and since the MFI’s equity is sunk, both parties’ disagreement payoffs are zero. When a borrower
and an MFI negotiate over a loan with private repayment, the interest rate is chosen such that it
maximizes the Nash product u1−βπβ subject to the borrower’s ICC. When two borrowers and an
MFI bargain over the interest rate on two loans with public repayment, one for each borrower, the
borrowers’ expected utilities are aggregated as 2u, and the Nash product is (2u)1−β(2π)β . Evidently,
maximization of this Nash product is equivalent to maximization of u1−βπβ . Thus, the share of
the total surplus the MFI gets does not depend on whether it negotiates with a single borrower or
with two borrowers.6 For either repayment type, both parties’ surpluses from the bargain are non-
negative provided that the total surplus is non-negative. However, the MFI enters the negotiation
3Given zero expected profit, active social MFIs are indifferent between making loans or not. Any small reward
would be sufficient to make lending strictly preferable to staying inactive.
4Alternatively, we could assume that social MFIs invest their equity in their loan portfolio and borrow only the
difference to loan demand l from the MIV. Although this is not equivalent, since the MIV’s state verification cost per
dollar lent is higher then, the results are identical. The chosen specification is much more convenient for our purposes,
since social MFIs behave exactly like the competitive lenders of Section 3.
5The analysis goes through with slight modifications under the more general assumption that a positive fraction
of the MFI’s equity is sunk.
6If the negotiation with two borrowers were modeled as a three-person bargaining problem, the MFI would get a
smaller share than with just one borrower involved. Our formulation of the bargaining problem implies that micro
borrowers are unable to raise their bargaining power in this way.
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only if its repayment per loan π is no less than the opportunity cost 1 + ρ. We call this condition
the MFI’s PC (though once it has sunk its equity, it would accept a surplus π < 1 + ρ).
To ensure that a successful borrower can repay two loans when repayment is public and one loan
if repayment is private, we assume that the payoff of a successful project is sufficiently high and
MFIs’ bargaining power is sufficiently low, in that
h > max
{
2Δ′, C
}
, (14)
where
Δ′ ≡ t
p(2− p) , (15)
and either
h < 2
(
1− p
p
)2
C (16)
or, if this inequality is violated,
β <
2− p
2
h
Δ′ − 2
h
Δ′ − (2− p)− (1−p)
2
p
C
Δ′
. (17)
Commercial MFIs
The derivation of the optimal contract between a commercial MFI and its borrowers is somewhat
tedious, so details are delegated to the Appendix. Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the
equilibrium repayment type graphically. We first consider the cases of public and private repayment
separately and then determine the equilibrium repayment type.
Consider first public repayment. A commercial MFI’s expected profit per loan is
π ≡ q[p(2− p)(1 + r∗)− t],
and a borrower’s expected utility is
u ≡ q[ph− p(2− p)(1 + r∗)− (1− p)2C].
Using (15), total surplus in the Nash bargain is 2c, where c ≡ q[ph − (1 − p)2C − p(2 − p)Δ′]. If
the borrowers’ ICC (3) is not binding, the interest rate is determined by the requirement that total
surplus is divided such that π = βc. Total surplus and 1+ r∗ rise when h increases or C decreases.
The borrowers’ ICC holds with equality on the upward-sloping line ICCpub in Figure 2: the higher
the return on investment in case of success h, the higher the interest rate 1 + r∗ and the penalty
11
Figure 2: Equilibrium repayment type with MFI bargaining power
required to make repayment of 1+ r∗ incentive compatible. Below ICCpub, the ICC is not binding.
The MFI’s PC π ≥ 1 + ρ holds with equality for (C/Δ′, h/Δ′)-combinations on the line PCpub
(notice that here and in what follows, other than in Section 3, the PC refers to the MFI rather
than the borrowers). For future reference, we note that this line is determined by
h
Δ′
=
Φ
β
+ 2− p+ (1− p)
2
p
C
Δ′
, (18)
where
Φ ≡ 1 + ρ
qpΔ′
(see equation (A.3) in the Appendix). Validity of the MFI’s PC implies that total surplus is positive.
So Nash bargaining yields the unconstrained solution in the cone formed by PCpub and ICCpub in
Figure 2.
Above ICCpub the project payoff h is so large that the unconstrained optimal repayment 1 + r
∗
violates the borrowers’ ICC (3). The interest rate is then determined by the condition that the
ICC holds with equality, so it depends on C but not on h. The penalty C and, hence, the interest
rate are large enough such that the MFI’s PC is satisfied on and to the right of the vertical line
PC ′pub in Figure 2. As in the case where the ICC is not binding, the borrowers “automatically” get
non-negative expected utility u for these parameters. So there is a bargaining solution at which the
borrower’s ICC is binding in the cone formed by ICCpub and PC
′
pub.
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The case of private repayment is treated analogously. A commercial MFI’s profit and a borrower’s
expected utility are
π ≡ q[p(1 + r∗)− t]
and
u ≡ q{p[h− (1 + r∗)]− (1− p)C},
respectively. As in the perfectly competitive model, there is an efficiency loss relative to public
repayment, since the probability of exerting the penalty C is 1 − p as compared to (1 − p)2. The
borrower’s ICC is given by (6). Despite the efficiency loss, there is scope for private repayment as
the equilibrium lending type, since the smaller repayment is easier to enforce (i.e., (6) is weaker than
(3)). The interest rate that maximizes the Nash product subject to u+π = c satisfies the borrower’s
ICC and the MFI’s PC on and above ICCpriv and PCpriv, respectively. Validity of the PC implies
non-negativity of total surplus. So Nash bargaining over a loan with individual repayment yields
an interest rate such that the borrower’s ICC is not binding in the cone formed by PCpriv and
ICCpriv in Figure 2. As in the case of public repayment, the interest rate is independent of h if the
ICC (6) is binding. It is large enough so that the MFI’s PC is satisfied on and to the right of the
vertical line PC ′priv. So Nash bargaining yields an interest rate such that the ICC is binding in the
cone formed by ICCpriv and PC
′
priv.
A solution to the contracting problem exists for (C/Δ′, h/Δ′) in the sawtooth shaped, shaded area
in Figure 2. For C low enough, it is not possible to enforce repayment of two loans, so only loans with
private repayment are feasible. For larger C-values, there is a threshold h-value below which only
public repayment loans are feasible, as the deadweight loss caused by private repayment loans is
too large. In the areas labeled A, B, and C in Figure 2, both repayment types are feasible. Whether
the loan entails public or private repayment then depends on which repayment type yields the
higher value of the Nash product. In the area labeled A, MFIs use public repayment. This follows
from the fact the ICC is not binding for either repayment type. So the the borrower and the MFI
get proportions 1− β and β, respectively, of the unconstrained maximized Nash product, which is
larger for public repayment due to the lower probability of exerting the penalty C. In the Appendix,
we show that both borrowers and MFIs also unanimously prefer public over private repayment for
parameters in area B, even though the ICC is binding then. Finally, in area C, where the ICC is
binding for both repayment types, MFIs prefer private repayment, but borrowers’ expected utility
is higher with public repayment. In the Appendix, we show that the Nash product is larger with
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Figure 3: Equilibrium repayment types with and without MFI bargaining power
public than with private repayment exactly if MFI bargaining power is sufficiently low, in that
β <
ln
(
1 + pCph−C
)
ln
(
1 + pCph−C
)
+ ln
[
1 + pC(1−p)C−(2−p)Δ′
] .
The Appendix also proves that assumptions (14)–(17) ensure that a successful borrower can repay
two loans with public repayment or one loan with private repayment.
Social versus commercial MFIs
For parameters in the sawtooth-shaped shaded area in Figure 2, MFIs adopt the commercial busi-
ness model. For parameters outside this area but inside the sawtooth-shaped shaded area in Figure
1, they adopt the social business model. Figure 3 merges these two figure in a (C, h)-diagram.
Superscripts com and soc indicate that the respective curves refer to MFIs with a commercial or
social business model, respectively. The slopes of all lines in Figure 3 as well as the h-intercepts
of PCsocpub and PC
soc
priv are independent of β. For β = 1, the h-intercepts of PC
com
pub and PC
com
priv are
located below the respective intercepts for the case of social lending.
As the MFIs favor commercial lending over social lending if both lending types are possible and
the slopes of the PCs with commercial and social lending are equal, only commercial lending takes
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place for β = 1. With falling β, PCcompub and PC
com
priv shift upwards and an area emerges where only
social lending is possible. For β → 0 the h-intercept of the PCs with commercial lending diverges
to infinity and only social lending takes place. For all parameters, we can derive the value of β at
which MFIs change the lending mode.
Proposition 3: Assume C is between ICCsocpriv and PC
′com
pub . For h above PC
soc
priv the MFI chose
social lending if
β <
Φ
h
Δ′ − (2− p)− 1−pp CΔ′
.
Assume C is on the right-hand side of PC ′compub . If C is on the left-hand side of ICC
soc
pub and h above
PCsocpriv or C on the right-hand side of ICC
soc
pub and h above PC
soc
pub, than the MFI chose social lending
if
β <
Φ
h
Δ′ − (2− p)− (1−p)
2
p
C
Δ′
.
If β is greater, the MFI chooses commercial lending.
Proof: For β equal to the term on the right-hand side of the first inequality, the PC for commercial
lending and public repayment holds with equality. For β equal to the term on the right-hand side
of the second inequality, the PC for commercial lending and private repayment holds with equality.
||
The smaller γ, the lower the h-intercept of the PCs for social lending. Hence, if MIVs can solve the
state verification problem at sufficiently low cost, then when lending commercially becomes unprof-
itable, the preferred alternative is not to shut down the MFI altogether but to raise money from
the MIV and lend at the competitive interest rate. A similar argument applies when commercial
lending with private repayment becomes unprofitable.
If there is a cross section of microfinance markets, each structured as described above, one will
observe relatively small commercial MFIs (with sufficiently high β), setting high interest rates and
generating sizeable profits, in one subset of the markets and socially oriented MFIs with higher
outreach, lending at competitive terms, in the other markets. This does not mean that the MIVs
pick the “wrong” MFIs or are inefficient as delegated monitors, but reflects their insistence that
the MFIs they refinance do not exert their market power in the market for microfinance.
5 Empirical evidence
This section presents empirical evidence on how MFIs obtain finance and make loans. We formulate
several hypotheses derived from, or motivated by, the theoretical model of the preceding sections
15
and test them empirically using a large data set on MFIs. The focus in on the relation between MFI
market power and the use of MIV finance. Our proxy for MFI market power is their net interest
margin defined as the ratio of net interest income, i.e., interest and fee income minus financial
expenses and loan losses, to the volume of outstanding loans. This measure corresponds roughly to
the interest rate premium (the difference between the interest rate on microcredit minus the rate
at which MFIs obtain funds), proposed by Yunus (2007) to classify MFIs according to the degree
of profit maximization. We do not subtract operating expenses from interest and fee income, but
include the ratio of total expenses to total assets as a separate regressor.
Hypotheses
The central result of the theoretical model is that MFIs with sufficiently high bargaining power in
the market for microcredit do not tap the market for MIV capital (Proposition 3). With the net
interest margin as our proxy for market power, we thus conjecture:
Hypothesis A1: The use of MIV funds is negatively related to the net interest margin.
Generally, it is easier for MFIs with a high net interest margin to repay their debt. If, nonetheless,
the data confirm the inverse relation between the net interest margin and MIV access in A1, this
can be interpreted as strong evidence for the relevance of the mechanism at work in our model.
Opting for the social business model enables MFIs to leverage their capital in our model, so social
MFIs have a larger loan portfolio. Making loans to MFIs causes state verification costs, however,
in our model, which can be regarded as an example of the different types of agency costs arising
in the MIV-MFI relationship. So social MFIs are predicted to have a higher cost of capital than
commercial MFIs:
Hypothesis A2: The use of MIV funds is positively related to the size of the loan portfolio.
Hypothesis A3: The use of MIV funds is positively related to the costs of an MFI.
Our MFI data also includes information on individual versus joint liability. We use this information
to perform a further robustness check of our model. As remarked in Section 3, it does not matter
whether there is individual or joint liability for loans with public repayment, since borrowers in-
sure themselves via side contracting anyway. By contrast, there is no joint liability for loans with
individual repayment. So if a fraction of the public repayment loans are designated as joint liability
loans, then parameter changes which make public repayment more likely increase the likelihood of
joint liability.
Hypothesis R1: For commercial MFIs, bargaining power is negatively related to the share of joint
liability.
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This is because, as explained in Section 4, the set of parameter values which lead to private repay-
ment grows when β rises.
Hypothesis R2: MFI costs are negatively related to the share of joint liability.
This is the assertion of Proposition 2 of the perfectly competitive model. The same conclusion also
follows from the model with market power.
Studies of gender effects in microfinance point out that women are particularly vulnerable to the
social penalties used by MFIs to enforce microloans (see, e.g., Rahman, 1999). So a larger share
of female borrowers can be interpreted as a higher value of the non-pecuniary penalty C in our
model. Since public repayment is the only way to enforce repayment for sufficiently high values of
C in our model, we have:
Hypothesis R3: The share of female borrowers is positively related to the share of joint liability.
Data and methodology
Data were obtained from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX). The dataset covers 5,299
observations (1,757 MFIs) from 110 countries over the years 2007–2010. 1,330 observations are
characterized by funding from MIVs.
First, we check whether the descriptive statistics of the MFIs in our data sample are in line with the
characteristics implied by the theoretical model. Then a regression analysis is performed. Due to the
short and unbalanced nature of the panel, we estimate pooled logit regressions using MFI-clustered
standard errors to examine the determinants of the access to MIV debt. The dependent variable
in our regressions is a dummy variable indicating whether an MFI has access to debt financing
from MIVs. In our baseline model, the set of regressors is confined to variables derived from the
theoretical model. The net interest margin serves as a proxy for β. The gross loan portfolio serves
as a proxy for l. To measure costs, we use total expenses.
In further regressions, we add macroeconomic, MFI-specific, and country-specific variables. The
macroeconomic control variables are the level and growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP).
The MFI-specific variables are MFI age, three dummy variables indicating whether the MFI receives
donations, takes deposits, and is subject to regulation, a dummy variable that indicates whether an
MFI operates non-profit or not, the fraction of female borrowers (as indicators of the MFI’s social
performance), the average outstanding balance, and MFI type (legal status). Finally, we control
for the MFI’s region. The variables are defined in Table 1.
Results
MFIs reporting to MIX indicate whether they operate for-profit or non-profit. The differences
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Table 1: Definition of variables.
Variable Description
Yield on gross portfolio
(nominal)
Cash flows of all interest, fees and commission payments received in the period under
consideration in relation to the average gross loan portfolio of the same period. Source: MIX
Market.
Net interest margin Yield on gross portfolio minus financial expense and write-offs adjusted for value of loans
recovered divided by average gross loan portfolio. Derived from MIX Market data.
Gross loan portfolio
(GLP)
Value of all principal loan amounts due at the end of the reporting period. Incorporates
current, delinquent and renegotiated loans, but excludes loans that have been written off. Unit:
USD. Source: MIX.
Number of active
borrowers
Number of active borrowers. Source: MIX.
Total expense/assets Total expense divided by average assets. Source: MIX.
Age in years Time (in years) the MFI has existed. Derived from MIX Market data.
Capital/asset ratio Total equity divided by total assets. Source: MIX.
Debt to equity ratio Total liabilities divided by total equity. Source: MIX.
Percent of female
borrowers
Share of microcredit clients that are female. Source: MIX.
Average outstanding
balance
Average gross loan portfolio divided by the number loans outstanding of the institution.
Source: MIX. Unit: USD.
Profit status Indicates if an MFI operate for profit or not (non-profit). Time-invariant dummy variables.
Source: MIX.
Percent of group lending Share of active microborrowers that receive group loans, either via solidarity lending or village
banking. Derived from MIX Market data.
Return on assets Net operating income less taxes divided by average assets. Source: MIX.
Loan loss rate Value of lonas written off minus value of loans recovered divided by average gross loan
portfolio. Source: MIX.
Portfolio at risk 30 days Measures the unpaid principal of loans on which installments have been 30 days past due and
is based on the total outstanding credit balance. Source: MIX.
Financial
expense/assets
Operating expense divided by average assets.
Operating
expense/assets
Operating expense divided by average assets. Source: MIX.
GDP Derived from the World Bank data platform. USD value of gross domestic product of the
country, in which the MFI mainly operates. Unit: (current) USD.
GDPgrowth Derived from the World Bank data platform. Growth rate of the GDP (annual percent).
Donations Dummy variable indicating if an MFI received donations. Missing values are treated as zero.
Derived from MIX Market data.
Deposits Dummy variable indicating whether an MFI takes deposits. Missing values are treated as zero.
Derived from MIX Market data.
Regulated Describes whether an MFI is subject to the supervision of a regulatory authority. Missing
values are treated as zero. Time-invariant dummy variable. Source: MIX.
Type Legal status of the MFI. The data set includes banks, credit unions, nonbank financial
institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and other types of MFIs. The category ‘Other’
also contains rural banks and unknown organizational types. Time-invariant dummy variables.
Source: MIX.
Region The geographical regions are Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North
Africa, Africa, South Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific
Area. Dummy variables. Source: MIX.
Note: Unless indicated otherwise the variables are relative measures.
between MFIs with and without access to funds from MIVs are shown in Table 2. Observations
with MIV funding appear to be more mature in terms of the age of the institution as well as larger
regarding number of active borrowers and gross loan portfolio. Consistent with our theoretical
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model, observations without access to MIV debt have a greater average value for the net interest
margin.
Table 2: Number of observations and means for selected metric variables by access to MIV funding.
total MFIs with access MFIs without access
N mean N mean N mean mean differences
Net interest margin 3993 0.251 1302 0.232 2691 0.260 –0.028***
Gross loan portfolio 5167 42.185 1329 53.733 3838 38.186 15.546**
Number of active borrowers 4801 65.908 1320 69.012 3481 64.730 4.282
Total expense/assets 4260 0.261 1308 0.249 2952 0.266 –0.017***
Age in years 5154 12.885 1328 13.768 3826 12.578 1.190***
Capital/asset ratio 5030 0.315 1321 0.260 3709 0.335 –0.075***
Debt to equity ratio 4814 4.798 1319 5.015 3495 4.716 0.299
Percent of female borrowers 3886 0.636 1216 0.650 2670 0.629 0.020**
Percent of group lending 3841 0.436 1194 0.435 2647 0.437 –0.002
Return on assets 4257 0.004 1308 0.021 2949 –0.003 0.025***
Yield on gross portfolio (nominal) 4121 0.340 1307 0.329 2814 0.345 –0.017***
Loan loss rate 4183 0.016 1308 0.016 2875 0.017 –0.001
Portfolio at risk 30 days 4155 0.072 1307 0.054 2848 0.080 –0.027***
Financial expense/assets 4239 0.054 1307 0.063 2932 0.049 0.014***
Operating expense/assets 4253 0.190 1308 0.167 2945 0.200 –0.032***
Observations 5299 1330 3969
Notes: a In thousands.
b In million USD.
To investigate the characteristics of non-profit and for-profit MFIs in our data sample, Table 3
presents descriptive statistics for selected variables by both types of MFIs. While non-profit MFIs
seem to be more mature regarding their age, for-profit MFIs appear to be larger in terms of number
of active borrowers and gross loan portfolio. Again, in line with the results of the theoretical model,
Table 3 reports a higher value of net interest margin for for-profit MFIs.
Table 3: Number of observations and means for selected metric variables by profit status.
total Non-profit MFIs For-profit MFIs
N mean N mean N mean mean differences
Net interest margin 3993 0.251 2431 0.238 1562 0.271 –0.033***
Gross loan portfolio 5167 42.185 3044 20.664 2123 73.042 –52.377***
Number of active borrowers 4801 65.908 2841 53.666 1960 83.651 –29.985**
Total expense/assets 4260 0.261 2577 0.257 1683 0.267 –0.011
Age in years 5154 12.885 3022 14.108 2132 11.151 2.957***
Capital/asset ratio 5030 0.315 2989 0.325 2041 0.3 0.025***
Debt to equity ratio 4814 4.798 2885 5.056 1929 4.412 0.643
Percent of female borrowers 3886 0.636 2430 0.657 1456 0.6 0.057***
Percent of group lending 3841 0.436 2299 0.46 1542 0.401 0.058***
Return on assets 4257 0.004 2573 0.002 1684 0.008 –0.006
Yield on gross portfolio (nominal) 4121 0.340 2495 0.321 1626 0.37 –0.049***
Loan loss rate 4183 0.016 2541 0.015 1642 0.018 –0.003*
Portfolio at risk 30 days 4155 0.072 2483 0.072 1672 0.072 0.000
Financial expense/assets 4239 0.054 2559 0.051 1680 0.057 –0.005***
Operating expense/assets 4253 0.190 2572 0.188 1681 0.192 –0.003
Observations 5299 3103 2196
Notes: a In thousands.
b In million USD.
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Table 4 presents the results of the logit regressions. Model I includes variables derived from the theo-
retical model related to the hypotheses A1–A3 and region as well as type dummy variables. Model II
adds additional MFI-specific as well as macroeconomic control variables. Model III includes a set
of variables which can be seen as proxies for the social performance of an MFI. Model specifica-
tion IV corresponds to model III, but additionally considers the fraction of loans granted via group
lending. Model V alternatively employs a group loan dummy instead of the fraction of group loans.
This indicator variable takes the value 1 if an MFI has more than 99 percent group loans, and 0
otherwise. Model specifications VI–IX present various subsample estimations.
The gross loan portfolio has a significant positive relationship with access to MIV debt. This is
consistent with the theoretical model’s predictions that an increase in the number of borrowers per
market l is conducive to the existence of a solution to the contracting problems. Furthermore, the
probability of access to MIV debt rises with decreasing costs in terms of total expenses. However,
this effect is not significant. Moreover, specifications I, III–V, VII, and VII of the empirical model
yield a negative and significant relationship between the net interest margin and access to debt from
MIVs. Because MFIs with sufficiently low values for β have access to MIV funds according to the
theoretical model, the negative sign of the net interest margin is in line with the theoretical results.
The average marginal effect (AME) corresponding to the significant coefficients of the net interest
margins in Table 4 ranges from –0.11 (model specification I) to –0.27 (model specification IV). For
example, the AME of the net interest margin in model specification III comprises –0.22. Hence, an
increase of the net interest margin of one percentage point7 results in a decrease of the likelihood
to use MIV funding of approximately 0.22 percentage points.
Regarding the control variables, another significant and plausible result is the negative coefficient of
the deposits dummy. Either MFIs that collect deposits are not demanding debt from MIVs because
deposits serve as a cheap type of funding or MIVs are not willing to invest in MFIs with other
funding sources.
Next, we turn to the determinants of individual versus joint liability. As information on the lending
mode has been collected only for 2009, we exclude the other years from this analysis. Table 5
presents additional empirical evidence regarding the hypotheses R1–R3 with the percentage of
group loans as dependent variable. Moreover, Table 6 shows the results for the respective logit
regressions with a group loan dummy as dependent variable.
We employ the percent of group loans as a proxy for public repayment. According to the theoretical
model, lower costs should be related with a higher share of public repayment, while there should
7As the standard deviation of the net interest margin is 0.19 in this sample, a change of one percentage point can
be considered as relatively small.
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be a positive relationship between non-pecuniary penalties and public repayment. We are not able
to measure non-pecuniary penalties, however, we expect female borrowers to suffer more from
these penalties. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the fraction of female borrowers
and group loans. Furthermore, commercial MFIs should show a negative relationship between the
bargaining power and public repayment according to the theoretical model.
Table 5: OLS regressions with country-clustered standard errors. The dependent variable is the
percentage of group loans. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Percent of group lending MFIs without access
Full sample to funds from MIVs
Hypo- Exp. Hypo- Exp.
tesis sign Model I Model II Model III tesis sign Model VI Model V
Net interest margin 0.252*** 0.127 0.121 R1 − 0.127 −0.001
Total expense/assets R2 − 0.118 0.070 0.071 R2 − 0.117 0.112
Percent of female borrowers R3 + 0.714*** 0.672*** 0.677*** R3 + 0.635*** 0.608***
MFI-specific control variables
log(GLP) −0.007 −0.005 −0.001
Age in years −0.000 −0.000 0.000
Donations=‘yes’ 0.031 0.031 0.052
Deposits=‘yes’ −0.020 −0.023 −0.024
Regulated=‘yes’ −0.003 −0.003 0.023
Access=‘yes’ −0.020
Social control variables
Average outstanding balancea −0.049***−0.050*** −0.046***
Non-profit=‘yes’ 0.047 0.048 0.062
Macroeconomic control variables
log(GDP) 0.007 0.007 0.005
GDP growth 0.808 0.813 1.051*
Region effects yes yes yes yes yes
Type effects yes yes yes yes yes
Constant −0.020 0.028 0.016 0.118 0.039
Observations 830 815 815 524 511
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.426 0.426 0.381 0.411
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a In thousand USD.
While we are not able to confirm or reject our hypotheses on costs and net interest margin, our
results show the expected significant positive relationship between fraction of female borrowers and
public repayment across all model specifications.
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Table 6: Logit regressions with country-clustered standard errors. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable indicating if group loans are the predominant lending methodology. The explana-
tory variables are defined in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Group lending dummy (1, if share of group loans > 0.99) MFIs without access
Full sample to funds from MIVs
Hypo- Exp. Hypo- Exp.
tesis sign Model I Model II Model III tesis sign Model VI Model V
Net interest margin 2.203** 0.798 0.751 R1 − 1.164 −0.110
Total expense/assets R2 − 0.295 −0.754 −0.831 R2 − 0.270 −0.471
Percent of female borrowers R3 + 2.992*** 1.537** 1.681*** R3 + 2.648*** 1.586**
MFI-specific control variables
log(GLP) −0.023 0.012 0.090
Age in years −0.008 −0.010 −0.002
Donations=‘yes’ −0.059 −0.057 −0.012
Deposits=‘yes’ −0.131 −0.179 −0.100
Regulated=‘yes’ 0.236 0.225 0.609*
Access=‘yes’ −0.349
Social control variables
Average outstanding balancea −3.485***−3.451*** −3.595**
Non-profit=‘yes’ 1.045** 1.074** 0.778
Macroeconomic control variables
log(GDP) 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.204**
GDP growth −2.832 −2.703 1.568
Constant −4.804***−6.101***−6.554*** −3.686*** −7.494***
Observations 830 815 815 524 511
Pseudo R2 0.271 0.344 0.346 0.244 0.318
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a In thousand USD.
6 Conclusion
Refinancing microfinance, and in a way that benefits poor borrowers, is set to remain a big chal-
lenge in economic development. MFIs will have to meet the return expectations of their suppliers
of capital, be they purely return-oriented or social-minded. This paper presents a model of the
microfinance financing chain, in which financial claims originating in markets where enforcement
relies on non-pecuniary penalties are converted into legally enforceable claims by MIVs, which act
as delegated monitors of the MFIs for investors. The process of channeling funds from investors to
microborrowers succeeds if the capital, agency, and transaction costs are sufficiently low. If MIVs
fund MFIs with relatively low profitability, this does not necessary reflect an inefficiency. We show
that this is possibly a reflection of the social mission they pursue, which makes them unattractive
as financiers for MFIs with high degrees of market power. The empirical analysis supports this
hypothesis: the net interest margin is negatively correlated with the use of MIV finance.
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Appendix
This appendix presents details of the derivation of the optimum contract with MFI bargaining
power omitted in the main text.
Public repayment
The total surplus is non-negative (i.e., c ≥ 0) if
h
Δ′
≥ 2− p+ (1− p)
2
p
C
Δ′
.
Suppose the ICC (3) is not binding, so that π maximizes (c−π)1−βπβ . The necessary and sufficient
optimality condition yields π = βc. The interest rate is obtained by substituting the definitions of
π and c:
1 + r∗ = β
ph− (1− p)2C
p(2− p) + (1− β)Δ
′. (A.1)
The borrower’s ICC is in fact not binding if
h
Δ′
≤ −1− β
β
(2− p) + (1− p)
(
1
β
+
1− p
p
)
C
Δ′
. (A.2)
ICCpub in Figure 2 represents the (C/Δ
′, h/Δ′)-combinations that satisfy (A.2) with equality. The
MFI’s PC π ≥ 1 + ρ is
h
Δ′
≥ 2− p+ Φ
β
+
(1− p)2
p
C
Δ′
, (A.3)
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where Φ is defined in the main text. PCpub in Figure 2 represents (A.3) with equality (see (18)).
Evidently, (A.3) implies that the total surplus is positive.
If (3) is binding, the interest rate is given by
1 + r∗ =
1− p
2− pC.
The MFI’s PC is
C
Δ′
≥ 2− p+Φ
1− p . (A.4)
PC ′pub represents (A.4) with equality. The borrower’s PC u ≥ 0 can be written as
h
Δ′
≥ 1− p
p
C
Δ′
. (A.5)
This inequality is valid, whenever the MFI’s PC holds. To see this, notice that the borrower’s PC
holds on and above the upward-sloping line given by (A.5) with equality. This line (not depicted in
Figure 2) intersects ICCpub from above at C/Δ
′ = (2− p)/(1− p). Hence, the line is located below
ICCpub for C/Δ
′ which satisfy (A.4), so validity of the MFI’s PC implies validity of the borrower’s
PC.
Private repayment
Total surplus is non-negative if
h
Δ′
≥ 2− p+ 1− p
p
C
Δ′
.
As in the case of public repayment, π = βc if the ICC is not binding. Substituting the expressions
for π and c for the case of individual repayment, we get the interest rate on an individual liability
loan:
1 + r∗ = β
(
h− 1− p
p
C
)
+ (1− β)(2− p)Δ′.
The ICC is then in fact not binding if
h
Δ′
≤ −1− β
β
(2− p) +
(
1
β
+
1− p
p
)
C
Δ′
. (A.6)
ICCpriv represents (A.6) with equality. The MFI’s PC is
h
Δ′
≥ 2− p+ Φ
β
+
1− p
p
C
Δ′
, (A.7)
which implies that total surplus is positive. PCpriv represents (A.7) with equality.
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If the borrower’s ICC is binding, the contractual repayment is 1 + r∗ = C, and the PCs are
C
Δ′
≥ 2− p+Φ (A.8)
for the MFI and
h
Δ′
≥ 1
p
C
Δ′
(A.9)
for the borrower. PC ′priv represents (A.8) with equality. Validity of (A.8) implies that (A.9) also
holds. This follows from the observation that (A.9) with equality determines a straight line (not
depicted) in Figure 2, which intersects ICCpriv from above at C/Δ
′ = 2− p.
Choice of contract
Consider the area labeled B in Figure 2. MFIs expected profit π evaluated at the interest rate for
public repayment when the ICC is binding is no less than evaluated at the interest rate for private
repayment when the ICC is not binding if
h
Δ′
≤ −1− β
β
(2− p) + (1− p)
(
1
β
+
1
p
)
C
Δ′
.
From (A.6), this condition is satisfied on and below ICCpriv. Borrower expected utility u is no less
with public repayment and the ICC binding than with private repayment and the ICC not binding
if
h
Δ′
≥ −1− β
β
(2− p) + 1− p
p
C
Δ′
.
From (A.2), this inequality is satisfied on and, hence, above ICCpub. So public repayment is pre-
ferred by both MFIs and borrowers for parameters in B.
Next, consider (C/Δ′, h/Δ′) in region C in Figure 2, where the ICC is binding with both repayment
types. Here, MFIs get lower expected profit with public than with private repayment (viz., π =
qp[(1 − p)C − (2 − p)Δ′], as compared to π = qp[C − (2 − p)Δ′]). Borrowers, on the other hand,
get higher expected utility (viz., u = q[ph − (1 − p)C], as compared to u = q(ph − C)). Public
repayment yields the higher value for the Nash product exactly if
[(1− p)C − (2− p)Δ′]β [ph− (1− p)C]1−β > [C − (2− p)Δ′]β(ph− C)1−β .
Solving for β yields the condition in the main text.
Ability to repay
For public repayment and the borrower’s ICC not binding, from (A.1), the condition h ≥ 2(1+ r∗)
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becomes
[2(1− β)− p] h
Δ′
≥ 2(1− β)(2− p)− 2β (1− p)
2
p
C
Δ′
. (A.10)
If repayment is public and the ICC is binding, the condition for ability to repay h ≥ 2(1 + r∗) is
h
Δ′
≥ 21− p
2− p
C
Δ′
. (A.11)
With individual repayment, borrowers are able to repay if
h
Δ′
≥ 2− p− β
1− β
1− p
p
C
Δ′
(A.12)
when the ICC is not binding and
h
Δ′
≥ C
Δ′
(A.13)
if the ICC is binding. Condition (14) implies that (A.11)–(A.13) are satisfied. Condition (14) further
implies that (A.10) is satisfied for β = 0. If condition (16) holds, then (A.10) is also satisfied for
β = 1 and, hence, for all β in between. For the opposite case, (17) follows from solving (A.10) for
β.
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